Padilla Presses Senior Defense Department Officials on PFAS Contamination Response
Inspector General report confirms Department of Defense knew about harmful PFAS chemicals for at least five years before notifying service members
WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senator Alex Padilla (D-Calif.) questioned witnesses during a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing to examine the Department of Defense’s failures to protect service members, their families, and communities across the country from toxic PFAS chemicals. The military’s heavy use of PFAS-based firefighting foam has polluted nearly 700 military sites across the country, including almost 70 in California. The recent Department of Defense Inspector General report confirmed that DOD knew about the harms posed by their use of PFAS, but waited years to notify and protect service members. They also failed to track the results of blood testing from military firefighters, in violation of their own policies.
WATCH: Padilla questions witnesses at HSGAC hearing on PFAS contamination
The witness panel included Sean O’Donnell, Inspector General, Environmental Protection Agency and Acting Inspector General, Department of Defense; Michael J. Roark, Deputy Inspector General for Evaluations, Department of Defense; Richard Kidd, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment and Energy Resilience, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Sustainment, U.S. Department of Defense; and Laura Macaluso, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Force Safety and Occupational Health, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Readiness, U.S. Department of Defense.
Padilla questioned the panel about what DOD knew about PFAS contamination, when they knew it, and why they failed to notify affected service members and communities. He also criticized the Department for not acting with more urgency to clean up their legacy pollution, noting that 30 years is an unacceptable timeline to complete clean-up and protect military communities. He also pressed the Department on why they deferred to industry rather than protecting the health and safety of service members and their families and surrounding communities.
California has some of the most contaminated military installations in the country, including: Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, Travis Air Force Base, Naval Air Station Alameda, Edwards Air Force Base, and Vandenberg Space Force Base. Padilla has been active in addressing PFAS contamination in California and across the country. In June, he introduced the Clean Water for Military Families Act, which would require the Department of Defense to conduct investigations and remediate PFAS contamination at and surrounding DOD installations in the U.S. and state-owned National Guard facilities. The bill authorizes a one-time, $10 billion investment for the investigations and clean-up to ensure military families have access to clean, pollutant-free drinking water. Additionally, Padilla led a bipartisan amendment to include dedicated PFAS clean up funding in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022. As a result of this effort, the final FY22 NDAA released on Tuesday includes an unprecedented $517 million for PFAS clean up. The Senate is due to vote on this legislation next week.
Key Excerpts:
- PADILLA: […] I’m outraged every time I hear the stories of service members in my state, who unknowingly raised their families near PFAS contaminated bases and had no idea of the danger until their kids started getting sick. The sheer number of these painful stories leave no doubt about the Department of Defense’s responsibility for this issue. But what the Inspector General report gave us is the proof the Department of Defense knew for at least five years, that PFAS posed a concern to human health before they took steps to protect service members from those toxic chemicals. The report confirms the department knew about the harm to these chemicals, but failed to actually notify service members for years. That is unacceptable. My first question is this, and I know that others have asked it, but Mr. Roark: When exactly did the Defense Department first learn that PFAS were emerging chemicals of concern that would impact drinking water in military communities? Was it 2011, 2006 or earlier? And I’m not asking—let me be precise—I’m not asking when the public knew, when did the department know?
ROARK: But the process began when PFAS and PFOA were added to the EC watch list. Then after that, there were a series of assessments that were done in the 2018-2019 range and that led up to the risk alert being issued in 2011, which described the risk to human health and the environment. So that’s the first key milestone there. And then in 2016 is when the EC program endorsed the risk management actions for PFAS containing AFFF.
- PADILLA: The inspector general report says the Defense Department issued a risk alert in 2011, but failed to take action until 2016. Why did the department wait five years to take action?
ROARK: So, I can take that question. So, in our report, we attributed the cause to some deficiencies in DOD policy, the DoD Instruction for emerging chemicals.
[…]
PADILLA: So, five years was the quickest we could have acted? That’s a question.
ROARK: Well, our report does criticize the department for not taking action earlier. And so, I think we’ve kind of gone through that today, discussing some of the steps that did occur and some of the warning signs that were in place and we did hear instances of officials telling us that they were relying on regulatory agencies to provide information.
- PADILLA: I do have two more questions I’d really like to include here. The first is related to what the Inspector General report says in their 2008 memorandum that further action—that the department at the time said further action—was not needed to address PFAS in firefighting foam because, quote, industry is taking appropriate action. First, this seems to suggested that the Defense Department of Defense knew as early as 2008, that PFAS was harmful. And second, we know now that what industry was doing at the time was replacing PFOS with PFBS, which is also toxic. So back to you, Mr. Roark, what action was industry taking at the time? And can you provide a copy of this 2008 memorandum to the committee?
[…]
KIDD: So, actually, industry started to express concerns about these chemicals in the 1990s. And the presumption of the country at the time was that industry would voluntarily fix, and, by replacing or removing PFAS in a in AFFF foam and we follow the lead of industry and regulatory agencies…
PADILLA: So, you followed the lead of industry and you defer to industry the health and safety of servicemembers and their families and surrounding communities? Or is that the federal government’s responsibility?
KIDD: That was the accepted practice at the time for this chemical as articulated by the regulatory agencies.
A full transcript of the questioning, as delivered, can be found below:
PADILLA
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by thanking you for this opportunity today to hear from the department directly, because it’s critical— and you heard this from all my colleagues—it’s critical that we do all we can to protect our servicemembers, as well as their families and surrounding communities from preventable harm. I think that’s been established here today. We need to continue working with the Department of Defense to craft real solutions and clean up PFAS, sooner rather than later. See, we’ve long known that military heavy use of PFAS based firefighting foam has impacted servicemembers and nearby communities. I may sound like a broken record at this point, but I’m outraged every time I hear the stories of service members in my state, who unknowingly raised their families near PFAS contaminated bases and had no idea of the danger until their kids started getting sick. The sheer number of these painful stories leave no doubt about the Department of Defense’s responsibility for this issue. But what the Inspector General report gave us is the proof the Department of Defense knew for at least five years, that PFAS posed a concern to human health before they took steps to protect service members from those toxic chemicals. The report confirms the department knew about the harm to these chemicals, but failed to actually notify service members for years. That is unacceptable. My first question is this, and I know that others have asked it, but Mr. Roark: When exactly did the Defense Department first learn that PFAS were emerging chemicals of concern that would impact drinking water in military communities? Was it 2011, 2006 or earlier? And I’m not asking—let me be precise—I’m not asking when the public knew, when did the department know?
ROARK
So, senator in response to this question, we talked about this a little bit earlier in the hearing. But the process began when PFAS and PFOA were added to the EC watch list. Then after that, there were a series of assessments that were done in the 2018-2019 range and that led up to the risk alert being issued in 2011, which described the risk to human health and the environment. So that’s the first key milestone there. And then in 2016 is when the EC program endorsed the risk management actions for PFAS containing AFFF.
PADILLA
Well, I think there’s overlapping timelines. One of dangers and risk of these chemicals, one of presence, use of chemicals. And, you know, one could logically assume that danger could have started back in the 70s, and knowledge of it back in the 70s. But we’ll continue that conversation. My next question is from Mr. O’Donnell. The inspector general report says the Defense Department issued a risk alert in 2011, but failed to take action until 2016. Why did the department wait five years to take action?
ROARK
So, I can take that question. So, in our report, we attributed the cause to some deficiencies in DOD policy, the DoD Instruction for emerging chemicals. And specifically, we made two recommendations in this regard that would strengthen the process to help initiate risk management actions based on measurable risks and also to develop risk management options and then initiate risk management actions as soon as possible, or as early as possible in the EC process. And as a result, our colleagues in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment did agree to those recommendations and I think Mr. Kidd testified earlier that they’re in the process of implementing those recommendations to improve that policy.
PADILLA
So, five years was the quickest we could have acted? That’s a question.
ROARK
Well, our report does criticize the department for not taking action earlier. And so, I think we’ve kind of gone through that today, discussing some of the steps that did occur and some of the warning signs that were in place and we did hear instances of officials telling us that they were relying on regulatory agencies to provide information. We also talked to officials who, you know, kind of discussed some of these ambiguities and policy which didn’t require specific action, it was more subjective. And so that’s why I think our recommendations are trying to bring a little bit more objectivity into the process.
PADILLA
All right, well I appreciate the objectivity, but I’m hoping you’re sensing from the committee, and I think it’s on a bipartisan basis here, a matter of urgency. Urgency. I’ll make note of, you know, one of the measures is Congress’ acted, including my Clean Water for Military Families Act that seeks to provide funding for the completion of testing assessment, but actual cleanup in a way that’s done sooner, rather than later. I think 30 years is way too long. What, maybe I can ask Mr. Kidd this, what could, what’s necessary to get this done faster? Had this cleanup be done in a matter of 10 years or less, not 30 years or more. What would it take?
KIDD
So, sir, first, a couple of things. So that so to answer your question directly, I’m not sure. As I said earlier, we are dealing with unknowns and uncertainties about how to detect PFAS, how to properly collect or dispose of it. The Department of Defense has the largest research effort in the federal government aimed at detecting and destroying PFAS. We are optimistic that we will help to change some of the parameters around the science and the engineering, but right now, we basically only have one technology to treat PFAS, which is granulated activated carbon filters. That is the current technology. If we can find other technologies, that will change the timeline. We’re in extensive discussion with our authorizing and appropriating committees. They’ve been very generous in giving us additional research funds to accelerate these efforts.
PADILLA
Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. But I do have two more questions I’d really like to include here. The first is related to what the Inspector General report says in their 2008 memorandum that further action—that the department at the time said further action—was not needed to address PFAS in firefighting foam because, quote, industry is taking appropriate action. First, this seems to suggested that the Defense Department of Defense knew as early as 2008, that PFAS was harmful. And second, we know now that what industry was doing at the time was replacing PFOS with PFBS, which is also toxic. So back to you, Mr. Roark, what action was industry taking at the time? And can you provide a copy of this 2008 memorandum to the committee?
ROARK
So, in our report, we do mention that August 20, 2008 memo that the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics issued that stated that they did not plan to take any risk management options for PFOUS since industry was taking action. Therefore, as a result of that, EC program officials did not present risk management actions to the to the EC governance council. The Undersecretary of Defense for ATL doesn’t exist anymore, but I think Mr. Kidd represents the predecessor organization to that. And so, I think he have to comment on that piece.
KIDD
So, actually, industry started to express concerns about these chemicals in the 1990s. And the presumption of the country at the time was that industry would voluntarily fix, and, by replacing or removing PFAS in a in AFFF foam and we follow the lead of industry and regulatory agencies as the concentrations and as the composition was changed and the concentrations were reduced of PFAS in the AFFF foams.
PADILLA
So, you followed the lead of industry and you defer to industry the health and safety of servicemembers and their families and surrounding communities? Or is that the federal government’s responsibility?
KIDD
That was the accepted practice at the time for this chemical as articulated by the regulatory agencies.
PADILLA
Okay, I hear responses and as I mentioned at the beginning, in addition to information objectivity, what we’re trying to make clear here is our sense of urgency. So let me make my final question this, and this is for all the witnesses. Have you lived on any of the sites that is now determined to have PFAS present? And if you have families, would you let your children drink the water? Yes or No?
O’DONNELL
No.
PADILLA
Thank you, Mr. O’Donnell. Mr. Roark?
ROARK
I can walk to Fort Belvoir from my house. I can see it out my window. So, I’m very close there and I don’t know if Fort Belvoir is on the list, but I do drink the water at my house. Thank you, Mr. Kidd?
KIDD
So, the answer is yes and yes. There is no community America that is drinking water above EPA health time, life, life health time advisory levels, where the known source can be traced to the Department of Defense. We surveyed over 500 drinking water systems on and off installations and took immediate action to address any PFAS that was above the EPA Health Advisory levels.
PADILLA
Ms. Malacuso?
MACALUSO
No, I have not lived on installation. And I guess it would depend whether on the installation or not about the water, do my due diligence, and make that decision.
PADILLA
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
###